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Abstract 
The performance of distributed networks depends on collaboration among distributed entities. To enhance security in 
distributed networks, such as ad hoc networks, it is important to evaluate the trustworthiness of participating entities 
since trust is the major driving force for collaboration. The trust based security protocol based on a cross-layer 
approach attains confidentiality and authentication of packets in both routing and link layers of MANETs but it 
doesn’t address few attacks like Bad Mouthing Attack, On-off Attack, and Conflicting Behavior Attack, Sybil 
Attack and Newcomer Attack. In this paper we present DAS, a protocol for reducing of the 
corruptive/malicious influences of Sybil attacks. Malicious users in general may create multiple identities with 
few trust relationships. Hence there is a disproportionately small gap in the graph between the Sybil nodes and 
the honest nodes. DAS exploits this property so as to bind the number of identities a malicious user can create. 
We simulate the effectiveness of DAS both analytically and experimentally.      
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1. Introduction 
In ad hoc networks, securing routing protocols is one of the fundamental challenges. While many secure routing 
schemes focus on preventing attackers from entering the network through secure key distribution or authentication 
and secure neighbor discovery, trust management can guard routing even if malicious nodes have gained access to 
the network.  Trust management can effectively improve network performance and detect malicious entities. 
Therefore, trust management itself is an attractive target for attackers. If a malicious node can create several faked 
IDs, the trust management system suffers from the Sybil attack [19]. The faked IDs can share or even take the blame, 
which should be given to the malicious node.  Most of the designs against such malicious behavior depend on the 
assumption that a certain fraction of the nodes in the system are honest. For instance, virtually all protocols for 
tolerating Byzantine failures assume that at least 2/3 of the nodes are honest. Thus, an effective defense against Sybil 
attacks would help in removal of a primary practical obstacle to collaborative tasks on peer-to-peer (P2P) and other 
decentralized systems.  
1.1 Problems with using Trusted Third Party (TTP) 
A trusted third party can be used to control Sybil attacks easily, that issues and verifies credentials unique to an actual 
human being. For instance, the system may require users to register with government-issued smart cards or pan cards, 
and then the barrier for launching a Sybil attack becomes much higher. The trusted third party may also instead 
require a payment for each identity.   
Unfortunately, there are many cases where such designs are not desirable. For instance, it may not be easy to 
select/establish a single entity that every user worldwide is willing to trust. Furthermore, the trusted third party can 
easily be a single point of failure, a single target for denial-of-service attacks, and also a bottleneck for performance, 
unless its functionality is it widely distributed. Requiring sensitive information or payment in order to use a system 
may scare away many potential users.  
1.2 Decentralized Approaches Vs Centralized Approaches  
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Without a trusted central authority defense against Sybil attacks is much harder. Many decentralized systems today 
try to defend Sybil attacks by binding an identity to an IP address. However, malicious users can readily harvest 
(steal) IP addresses.   
A malicious user can compromise a large number of end-user machines, thus creating a botnet of thousands of 
compromised machines spread throughout the Internet. Botnets in general are particularly hard to defend against 
because nodes in botnets are indeed distributed end users’ computers. The investigations into Sybil attacks [21] 
showed that they cannot be prevented unless special assumptions are made.    
The difficulty is from the fact that resource-challenge approaches, such as computation puzzles, require the 
challenges to be posed/validated simultaneously. Moreover, the adversary/misfeasor can potentially have 
significantly more resources than a typical end user. Puzzles that require human efforts, such as CAPTCHAs [23], 
can be reposted on the adversary’s web site to be solved by other users seeking access to the site. Furthermore, these 
challenges must be performed directly instead of trusting someone else’s challenge results, because Sybil nodes can 
vouch for each other. A more recent proposal [20] suggests the use of network coordinates [22] to determine whether 
multiple identities belong to the same user (i.e., have similar network coordinates).   
1.3 DAS: A New defense Against Sybil Attacks   
This paper presents DAS, a novel decentralized protocol that limits the corruptive influence of Sybil attacks, 
including Sybil attacks exploiting IP harvesting and even some Sybil attacks launched from botnets outside the 
system.   
Identities are nodes in the graph and (undirected) edges are human-established trust relations (e.g., friend relations). 
The edges connecting the honest region (i.e., the region containing all the honest nodes) and the Sybil region (i.e., the 
region containing all the Sybil identities created by malicious users) are called attack edges. Our protocol ensures 
that the number of attack edges is independent of the number of Sybil identities, and is limited by the number of trust 
relation pairs between malicious users and honest users.DAS relies on a special kind of verifiable random walk in the 
graph and intersections  between such walks. These walks are designed so that the small quotient cut between the 
Sybil region and the honest region can be used against the malicious users, to bound the number of Sybil identities 
that they can create. We will show the effectiveness of DAS both analytically and experimentally.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure.1. A Network with Honest and Sybil Nodes. 
2. Model and Problem Formulation  
In ad hoc networks, securing routing protocols is one of the fundamental challenges. While many secure routing 
schemes focus on preventing attackers from entering the network through secure key distribution or authentication 
and secure neighbor discovery, trust management can guard routing even if malicious nodes have gained access to 
the network. 
The system has n honest human beings as honest users, and one or more malicious human beings as malicious users. 
By definition, a user is distinct. Each honest user has a single (honest) identity, while each malicious user has one or 
more (malicious) identities. To unify terminology, we simply refer to all the identities created by the malicious users 
as Sybil identities. Identities are also called nodes, and we will from now on use “identity” and “node” 
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interchangeably. All malicious users may collude, and we say that they are all under the control of an adversary. 
Nodes participate in the system to receive and provide service (e.g., file backup service) as peers. Because the nodes 
in the system may be honest or Sybil, a defense system against Sybil attacks aims to provide a mechanism for a node 
V to decide whether or not to accept or reject another node S. Accepting S means that V is willing to receive service 
from and provide service to S. Ideally, the defense system should guarantee that V accepts only honest nodes.  
Because such an idealized guarantee is challenging to achieve, we aim at providing the following guarantees that, 
while weaker, are still sufficiently strong to be useful. The first guarantee is based on defining an equivalence [4] 
relation among accepted nodes. The equivalence relation partitions all accepted nodes into equivalence classes, 
called equivalence groups.  
Notice that nodes that are rejected do not belong to any equivalence groups. An equivalence group that includes one 
or more Sybil nodes is called a Sybil group. The defense system provides a guaranteed bound on the number of Sybil 
groups, without necessarily knowing which groups are Sybil. If the defense system guarantees that the number of 
Sybil groups is at most some value g, then placing the file on nodes from g+1 different equivalence groups will 
ensure at least one good copy of the file. Another example is replicating a file that is not signed. As long as we obtain 
the file from 2g+1 nodes from 2g+1 different equivalence groups, the majority is guaranteed to have the correct file. 
In some other scenarios the bound on the number of Sybil groups depends on how “powerful” the adversary is. 
A defense system may further bound the number of nodes accepted into each of the g Sybil groups. If the number of 
nodes in each Sybil group (or the size of the Sybil group) is at most w, then a node will accept at most g ·w Sybil 
nodes. To see the benefits of bounding both the number and size of the Sybil groups, consider our running example 
of replicating unsigned and signed files. Suppose we use a simple assignment that maps replicas to random nodes. If 
g · w is smaller than the number of honest nodes n, then from Chernoff bounds [24], the probability of having a 
majority of the replicas on honest nodes (as required for unsigned files) approaches 1.0 exponentially fast with the 
number of replicas. 
 
3. DAS Design 
In the network under consideration each pair of friends shares a unique symmetric secret key (e.g., a shared password) 
called the edge key. The edge key is used to authenticate messages between the two friends (e.g., with a Message 
Authentication Code). Because only the two friends need to know the edge key, key distribution is easily done 
out-of-band (e.g., via phone calls). A node can also revoke an edge key unilaterally simply by discontinuing use of 
the key and discarding it. A node informs its friends of its IP address whenever its IP address changes, to allow 
continued communication via the network. This IP address is used only as a hint. It does not result in vulnerability 
even if the IP address is wrong, because authentication based on the edge key will always be performed. If DNS and 
DNS names are available, nodes may also provide DNS names and only update the DNS record when the IP address 
changes. 
In ad hoc networks, securing routing protocols is one of the fundamental challenges. While many secure routing 
schemes focus on preventing attackers from entering the network through secure key distribution or authentication 
and secure neighbor discovery, trust management can guard routing even if malicious nodes have gained access to 
the network. 
The effectiveness of DAS relies on there being a limited number of attack edges (g). There are several ways the 
adversary might attempt to increase g: 
• The malicious users establish social trust and convince more honest users in the system to “be their friends” 
in real life. But this is quite difficult to do on a large scale. 
• A malicious user (Bob) who managed to convince an honest user (John) to be her friend creates many Sybil 
nodes, and then tries to convince John to also be friends with these Sybil nodes. But John only has a single 
edge key corresponding to the edge between Alice and Bob. As a result, all messages authenticated using 
that edge key will be considered by John to come from the same edge. Thus the number of attack edges 
remains unchanged. 
• The adversary compromises a single honest node with degree d. Because d was already constrained (before 
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the node is compromised) within some constant by the user, g can be increased by at most some constant. 
On the other hand, the adversary will not be able to create further attack edges from the node because 
adding an edge to another honest user requires out-of- band verification by that user. When a user drops and 
then makes new friends, it is possible for the adversary with access to the old edge keys to “resurrect” 
dropped edges and hence further increase g. However, we expect such effect to be negligible in practice and 
if necessary, can be prevented by requiring out-of-band confirmation when deleting edges. 
• The adversary compromises a small fraction of the nodes in the system. This will not likely increase g 
excessively due to the reasons above. 
• The adversary compromises a large fraction of the nodes in the system. Here the system has already been 
subverted, and the adversary does not even need to launch a Sybil attack. DAS will not help here. 
• The adversary compromises a large number of computers (i.e., creates a botnet), only some of which belong 
to the system.  
The increase in g is upper bounded by some constant times the number of compromised computers which already 
belong to the system. The increase is not affected by the total size of the botnet. Although acquiring a botnet with 
many nodes may be relatively easy (e.g., in the black market), acquiring a botnet containing many nodes that are 
already in the system is more challenging 
In summary, DAS is quite effective in limiting the number of attack edges, as long as not too many honest users are 
compromised. Relatively speaking, DAS is more effective defending against malicious users than defending against 
compromised honest users that belong to the system. This is because a malicious user must make real friends in order 
to increase the number of attack edges, while compromised honest users already have friends.  
DAS requires each node S to register with all w nodes along each of its routes. A node Q along the route permits S to 
register only if S is one of the nodes that are within w hops “upstream”. When the verifier V wants to verify S, V will 
ask the intersection point (between S’s route and V’s route) whether S is indeed registered. In this registration 
process, each node needs to use a “token” that cannot be easily forged by other nodes. Note that the availability of 
such tokens does not solve the Sybil attack problem by itself, because a malicious user may have many such tokens. 
A node will be accepted based on its token. This design assumed no IP spoofing, and was mainly suited for users 
with static or slowly changing IP addresses.   
Our current design of DAS uses public key cryptography for the tokens. Each honest node has a locally generated 
public/private key pair. Notice that these public and private keys have no connection with the edge keys (which are 
secret symmetric keys). Malicious nodes may create as many public/private key pairs as they wish. We use the 
private key of each node as the unforgettable token, while the public key is registered along the random routes as a 
proof of owning the token. Note that we do not intend or need to solve the public key distribution problem, because 
we are not concerned with associating public keys to, for example, human beings or computers. The only property 
DAS relies on is that the private key is unforgettable and its possession can be verified. 
A Sybil node may not follow the protocol and may arbitrarily manipulate the registry tables and witness tables. DAS 
is still secure against such attacks. To understand why and obtain intuition, it helps to consider the set of all registry 
table entries on all honest nodes in the system. For simplicity, assume that all honest nodes have the same degree d. 
Thus there are altogether, n · d ·w registry table entries in the system.    
Consider a malicious node M and a single attack edge connecting an honest node A with M. Clearly, M can 
propagate to A an arbitrary registry table, thus polluting the w entries in A’s registry table. Suppose A next forwards 
the registry table to B, who shifts the table downward and adds A as the first entry. Thus w−1 entries in B’s registry 
table are polluted. Continuing this argument, we see that a single attack edge enables M to control w+(w−1)+. . .+1≈ 
w
2
/2 entries system-wide. With g attack edges and even when gw approaches n, the total number of polluted entries 
(gw
2
/2) is still less than half of the total number of entries (n · d · w). This provides some intuition why the number of 
accepted Sybil nodes is properly bounded even though the adversary may not follow the DAS protocol. The system 
has n honest human beings as honest users, and one or more malicious human beings as malicious users.  
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3. Evaluation  
This section uses simulation to evaluate the guarantees of DAS. We choose to use simulation because it enables us to 
study large-scale systems. We use the model to instantiate three different graphs: a million-node graph with average 
node degree of 24, a 10000-node graph with average degree of 24, and a 100-node graph with average degree of 12. 
For space limitations, we leave to [27] a review of the model and the detailed parameters. We also focus on the 
million-node graph, and present only summary results for the other two graphs. All results below are for the 
million-node graph unless otherwise mentioned.    
4.1 Results with No Malicious Users 
We start by studying the basic behavior of DAS when there are no malicious users. Without malicious users, the only 
property we are concerned with is whether an honest verifier accepts an honest suspect. Probability of an honest node 
being successfully accepted. We move on to study the probability of the verifier V accepting the suspect S. For V to 
accept S, their routes must intersect and at least one intersection must be online. We do not directly model nodes 
being online or offline. Rather, we assume that as long as there are at least 10 intersections, the verification succeeds. 
Note that even when nodes are online only 20% of the time, the probability that at least one out of 10 intersections is 
online is already roughly 90% other two graphs. All results below are for the million-node graph unless otherwise 
mentioned.    
 
4.2 Results with Sybil Attackers   
Next we study the behavior of DAS when there are malicious users. In most security research, the term  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure.2. Probability of intersection. 
Figure.2. Represents legend “with redundancy” means that each node performs random routes along all directions, 
while “no redundancy” means performing a single random route. The legend “(>= x)” means that we are considering 
the probability of having at least x distinct intersections. DAS corresponds to “with redundancy (>= 10)”. 
 
“malicious user” typically refers to a single malicious user who does not assume additional identities. 
In this paper, however, malicious users refer to powerful attackers who have the sophistication and computation 
power to launch Sybil attacks. For clarity, we use “Sybil attackers” to refer to these users in our evaluation. Each of 
these Sybil attackers can potentially create an unlimited number of “malicious users”. 
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Figure.3. Probability of routes remaining entirely within the honest region. 
 
For our experiments based on the million-node graph, we vary the number of attack edges g  from 0 to 2500. When 
g = 2500, there are roughly 100 nodes marked as Sybil attackers. It is crucial to understand that just having 100 Sybil 
attackers in the system will not necessarily result in 2500 attack edges on average, each attacker must be able to 
convince 25 real human beings to be his friend. The hardness of creating these social links is what DAS relies on. In 
the presence of Sybil attackers, we are concerned with several measures of “goodness”: (i) the probability that an 
honest node accepts more than g · w Sybil nodes; (ii) the probability that an honest node accepts another honest node; 
and (iii) the impact of Sybil nodes on estimating w. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure.4. Probability of an honest node accepting another honest node (i.e., having at least a target number of 
intersections).The legends are the same as in Figure 3, and Sybil Guard corresponds to “with redundancy (>= 
10)” 
5. Conclusion 
This paper presented DAS, a novel decentralized protocol for reducing the corruptive influences of Sybil attacks, by 
bounding both the number and size of Sybil groups. DAS relies on properties of the users’ underlying social network, 
namely that (i) the honest region of the network is fast mixing, and (ii) malicious users may create many nodes but 
relatively few attack edges. In all our simulation experiments with one million nodes, DAS ensured that (i) the 
number and size of Sybil groups are properly bounded for 99.8% of the honest users, and (ii) an honest node can 
accept, and be accepted by, 99.8% of all other honest nodes. Still a lot more dimensions have to be worked on and 
the research work is still wide open. 
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